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TIM HERING*
Users and Abusers:  Has the
Distinction Been Legislated out of
Copyright?
The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept.
—William Shakespeare1
At the Forty-Sixth Annual Grammy Awards, RecordingAcademy President Neil Portnow took the stage following
a touching tribute to the late Warren Zevon.  The mood was som-
ber, as was Mr. Portnow’s message.2  The recording industry was
emerging from a “perfect storm,” he noted, which is to say the
advent of peer-to-peer file sharing.3  After studying the issue, the
industry had decided to launch a new campaign to convince the
public not to trade music.  It had created a website, “What’s the
Download.com,” as well as various public service announce-
ments.  Mr. Portnow presented the first of those public an-
nouncements at the Grammys, a commercial that alternated
between scenes of a teenage girl idly downloading a music file on
her home computer and a nightclub pulsating with dancing and
loud music.  As the girl’s download completes, the music in the
* J.D., University of Oregon School of Law, 2005.  Executive Editor, Oregon Law
Review , 2004-05.  Many thanks to Professor Keith Aoki for his books and ideas, and
to the editing team of Karen Ellis Carr, Jessica Russell, and Jared Moss.  I am also
grateful and indebted to my wife, Shel Seaver, for her patience and laughter, as well
as to my father, Fred Hering, for his years of encouragement and example.
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, act 2, sc. 2.
2 In fact, although the network played “Keep Me in Your Heart for a While”
during the tribute, a more appropriate introduction to Mr. Portnow might have been
Zevon’s “Lawyers, Guns and Money.”
3 Neil Portnow, Remarks at the 46th Annual Grammy Awards Telecast (Feb. 8,
2004), available at  http://www.grammy.com/features/2004/0208neilspeech.aspx.
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club falls silent and the dancers are struck dumb.  The message:
sharing digital files over the Internet will destroy the recording
industry and music will disappear.
The recording industry’s crisis is not entirely new, nor is its
response.  Historically, as technology has advanced, copyright
owners have worried about the possible effects of that technol-
ogy on their works.4  When piano rolls became popular in the
early part of the twentieth century, for example, composers of
music were concerned because the copyright in their composi-
tions did not extend to the piano roll.5  To protect their works the
composers turned to Congress to reconfigure copyright law in a
way that addressed the new technology.6  So has the recording
industry.
In setting copyright law, Congress is charged with balancing
the public’s interest in the free flow of ideas and private copy-
right owners’ interest in profiting from their works.  Yet in devel-
oping the laws, Congress has more often left it to the copyright-
related industries to work out the specifics amongst themselves.7
After all, for most of its history copyright has been of little prac-
tical importance to the average person, pertaining more to au-
thors and distributors.8  This Comment will explore how this
method of legislative compromise has tended to expand the
rights of copyright owners while limiting the rights of the public.
Part I discusses the traditional balance in copyright law.  Part II
then traces the progression of copyright legislation in order to
demonstrate how that balance has gradually been upset.  Princi-
ples which have tended to maintain the rights of the public will
be explored, including fair use and the doctrine of substantial
noninfringing uses.  Next, Part III argues that the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, as thus far interpreted, lays waste to the
remaining balance.  Part IV then addresses two issues that arise
out of the advent of digital technology:  circumventing technolog-
ical controls to access digital works and peer-to-peer file sharing.
4 See JESSICA LITMAN, Copyright and Compromise , in DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35,
35 (2001); see also Robin D. Gross, Copyright Zealotry in a Digital World: Can Free-
dom of Speech Survive? , in COPY FIGHTS 189, 191-92 (Adam Thierer & Wayne
Crews eds., 2002).
5 LITMAN, supra note 4, at 39. R
6 Id.
7 JESSICA LITMAN, The Art of Making Copyright Laws , in DIGITAL COPYRIGHT,
supra  note 4, at 23. R
8 See generally JESSICA LITTMAN, A Thought Experiment , in DIGITAL COPY-
RIGHT, supra  note 4, at 70. R
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In this section recent case law is explored to demonstrate that the
potential exists for a judicial restoration of public rights.  Finally,
Part V discusses pending legislation that would, if enacted, do
much to restore the historic balance in copyright.
I
TRADITIONAL BALANCE IN COPYRIGHT LAW:  THE
BARGAIN THEORY
On an elementary level, copyright law can be thought of as a
bargain between the public at large and private copyright own-
ers.9  In exchange for acquiescing to a statutory mechanism that
enables copyright owners to profit from their works, the public
gets limited access to and use of those works during a set pe-
riod,10 and unlimited access and use thereafter.  The underlying
framework for this bargain was set forth by the Framers in Arti-
cle I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, which empowers
Congress to secure “for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings” in order to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”11  Although the Copyright
Clause was approved without debate and in a secret proceeding
in 1787, leaving scant record of the Framers’ intent, the language
suggests that the Framers intended to set in place an incentive
system under which authors would be rewarded and therefore
encouraged to create new works, which in turn would benefit
public welfare.12  Subsequent cases have reaffirmed this pre-
9 See  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(stating that copyright is “intended to motivate the creative activity of authors . . . by
the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired”).  Neverthe-
less, as will be discussed, the public has become increasingly absent from the bar-
gaining process, i.e., the legislative process, during which the “special reward” is
determined.
10 The current copyright term is the life of the author plus seventy years for most
works created on or after January 1, 1978; for anonymous, pseudonymous, or works
made for hire, it is ninety-five years from publication or 120 years from creation,
whichever is sooner.  17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (2000).
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Note that U.S. copyright law was originally
modeled after the British system, specifically the Statute of Anne, and that much
scholarship can be found tracing the roots of American copyright policy to well
before the Copyright Clause was adopted. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT
LAW § 1.03[A], at 15-19 (6th ed. 2003).  For the purpose of this Comment, however,
we need not delve further back than the Constitution.
12 JOYCE ET AL., supra  note 11, at 19 (citing Ralph Oman, The Copyright Clause: R
“A Charter for a Living People,” Address Before the American Bar Association
Convention (Aug. 10, 1987), in  17 U. BALT. L. REV. 99, 103 (1987)).
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mise.13  Justice O’Connor, for example, famously noted that
“[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of
authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.’”14
Perhaps the bargain is more accurately described as one be-
tween copyright owners and Congress, acting on behalf of the
public.15  In setting the terms of the bargain, Congress is to be
guided by the principles set forth in the Constitution.  Specifi-
cally, Congress should seek to promote learning, preserve the
public domain, and protect authors, in that order.16  That Con-
gress should promote learning is stated directly; preserving the
public domain is the obvious result of granting monopolies for
only “limited times”; and protecting authors is the mechanism by
which each of the first two policy objectives are achieved.17  It
follows that since the third objective—protecting authors by
granting them exclusive rights to their works—is not an end in
itself, Congress should consider it only inasmuch as it relates to
furthering the previous two objectives.18
A fourth principle is implicit in the language of the Copyright
Clause:  that people have a right to use copyrighted works.19
This inference owes itself to the fact that at the time the Copy-
right Clause was adopted (and for nearly the next two hundred
years) federal copyright protection was contingent upon publica-
tion.20  An author received no protection under the copyright
13 See  Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932) (“The sole interest of
the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the gen-
eral benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”); Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate effect of . . . copy-
right law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the ultimate
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”).
14 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (alteration in
original).
15 L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT:
A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 138 (1991).
16 Id . at 48-49.
17 Id . at 49.
18 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431-32
(1984).
19 PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra  note 15, at 52. R
20 See, for example, the Copyright Act of 1909, which stated that “any person . . .
may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice of copy-
right required by this Act.”  Pub. L. No. 349, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (1909).
Prior to the 1909 Act, copyright protection began when a title was filed for registra-
tion, which likewise provided public knowledge of and access to the work.
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statute for his or her work unless and until it was published.21
The requirement of publication emphasized the bargain theory of
copyright and how that bargain sought to grant the public a right
to use copyrighted works.22  Congress did not compel authors to
disclose their works to the public; a novel could remain in one’s
desk indefinitely, or for that matter could be tossed into the sea.
The public had no direct right to the work.  However, in ex-
change for copyright protection (and thus the ability to profit
from the work) authors had to publish.  The act of publishing,
then, guaranteed the public’s access to the copyrighted work, and
guaranteed, within the confines of the law, its use of the work.
Under this basic framework, copyright law developed a set of
exclusive, but limited, rights for authors.  For example, the text of
the 1909 Act granted the owner of a copyright the right to,
among other things, “print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the
copyrighted work.”23  These rights were subject to various limit-
ing doctrines such as fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy,
both of which will be discussed in greater detail in Part II.  To
some extent, the exclusive rights and their limitations were devel-
oped with the Constitutional principles in mind, meaning that the
traditional balance between public and private interests was
more or less maintained.  As has long been the case for copyright
law, however, the 1909 Act was pushed to the breaking point by
subsequent developments in technology.  These technological ad-
vances called for significant amendments to the law throughout




A. Natural Law vs. Statutory Grant
Before looking into the ways in which copyright law was
amended during the twentieth century, it is important to point
out the two competing theories underpinning copyright.  De-
21 For most of its history, U.S. copyright law existed as a bifurcated system; un-
published works were protected, if at all, by state common law.  Once a work was
published, it fell under the purview of federal law.  The 1976 Act, however, essen-
tially abolished common-law copyright by granting federal protection to works upon
their being fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note
11, at 12. R
22 See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra  note 15, at 52. R
23 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000)).
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pending on whom you ask, copyright is either a natural-law prop-
erty right or a limited statutorily-granted monopoly.24  As is
evident from the preceding section, the statutory grant theory is
supported by the text of the Constitution and at least mentioned
in case law; the natural-law property right theory, however, has
nevertheless gained increasing support.25
Thinking of copyright in terms of real property is not surpris-
ing given the strong emphasis on property rights in the United
States.  Still, the notion that authors have an inherent right to
their intellectual property is more accurately thought of as a
creature of civil law.26  The French analogue of copyright, “droit
d ’auteur ,” or the German “Urheberrecht ,” both essentially trans-
late to “authors’ rights,” and the language is telling.27  If authors
have an inherent property right in their works, then control of
those works must primarily be theirs.  Indeed, synonymous with
the notion of authors’ rights is the notion of moral rights—that
an author’s work is an extension of his or her personality, and as
such the author should retain control over the way in which the
work is used.28  Moral rights generally include the right to insist
that the integrity of the work is not harmed, the right to be ac-
knowledged as the author, the right to determine when and how
the work will be disclosed to the public, and even the right to
recall all copies of the work or preclude excessive criticism.29
Important consequences attach to adopting one theory over
the other.  For instance, granting such extensive rights to authors
necessitates a corresponding decrease in the rights of the public.
Obviously there are numerous problems with shrinking the rights
of the public.  Most important, perhaps, is the melding of the dis-
24 Obviously many copyright owners will lean toward the proprietary theory, as it
enlarges their rights, while users of copyrighted works (including some authors) will
lean toward the regulatory theory.  As to the source of the two theories, some com-
mentators make the distinction thus:  the natural-law theory is a product of judicial
decisions while copyright legislation is the source of the statutory grant theory. See
PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra  note 15, at 110.  At least one federal appellate R
judge has specifically addressed the issue, noting that “natural law copyright . . . is
not a part of our system.”  Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257,
1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (Birch, J.).
25 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 27-28. R
26 The conflict between the two theories likely began during the eighteenth cen-
tury in England, when booksellers introduced the notion of common-law copyright
protection for authors. PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra  note 15, at 110. R
27 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 27. R
28 See id.  at 607-08; see also PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra  note 15, at 166. R
29 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 608. R
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tinction between the copyright in a work and the work itself.30
American copyright law has always at least attempted to make
this critical distinction.31  On its face, the distinction is clear
enough:  copyright does not attach to the physical object on
which a copyrighted work is fixed.  Thus, when an author sells a
copy of a novel, he or she retains the copyright while not retain-
ing any right to the book itself.  The purchaser of the book is free
to read the book, tear it up, give it away to a friend, or even resell
it at a garage sale or a used bookstore.  However, the purchaser
may not infringe the author’s copyright in the work by, for exam-
ple, making wholesale copies of the book and distributing them.
The distinction is further illustrated by the fact that the author,
even after selling a copy of the novel, remains free to transfer all
or part of the copyright in the work.32
Under a system based on the moral rights of authors, this dis-
tinction is largely lost because the author retains an interest in
not only the copyright, but also the work itself.  The right to pre-
serve the integrity of a work or “to be free from vexatious or
malicious attacks on a work, on the basis that the work consti-
tutes an extension of its creator’s person” extends an author’s
control beyond just the copyright.33  Moreover, not acknowledg-
ing the distinction between the copyright and the work itself frus-
trates the fundamental purpose behind copyright—to promote
learning—because access and use of copyrighted works is limited
beyond that necessary to encourage authors to create.34
Despite the potential deleterious effect on the constitutional
goal of promoting the public welfare, the notion of authors’
rights has taken an increasingly visible role in the American cop-
yright system.  This is due in large part to efforts to bring interna-
tional uniformity to copyright laws, but it is due even more to the
way in which copyright legislation has been enacted in this
country.
30 See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra  note 15, at 13-14. R
31 See, e.g. , 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1977) (“[C]opyright is distinct from the property in the
material object copyrighted.”) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000)); see also
PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra  note 15, at 13 (noting that the distinction has al- R
ways existed, but was clarified by the Copyright Act of 1976, which made copyright
divisible).
32 See  § 202.
33 JOYCE ET AL., supra  note 11, at 608. R
34 See  PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra  note 15, at 13. R
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B. Copyright Legislation
Imagine if you will a science class in junior high school.  At
each station, the teacher has set out a balance which the students
must learn to use for experiments.  In front of each balance is a
small set of metal pieces of varying sizes and weights.  (Yes, this
is before digital scales were used.)  Each piece is carefully
marked, ranging from one to one hundred grams.  First off, the
students are instructed to set a twenty-gram weight on one side
of the balance and two ten-gram weights on the other, resulting,
of course, in a happy equilibrium.  Next, the students are en-
couraged to experiment.  Cautiously they begin, placing a tiny
one-gram unit on one side.  From that single piece, the students
see the scale tip, but almost undetectably, and so they put on
another and another, watching the distribution shift.  Through
experimentation, the students try to make incremental changes
that will not send one side crashing down onto the countertop.
In like manner, copyright legislation has been enacted, with sub-
tle one-gram shifts in favor of authors and copyright owners be-
ing placed on the scale incrementally, slowly but not entirely
upsetting the balance between public and private interests.
The story of copyright law is one of adaptation, of
“respon[ding] to new technologies in the reproduction and distri-
bution of human expression.”35  Countless times since the inven-
tion of the printing press made copyright necessary,36 the laws
protecting authors (and ostensibly the public) have had to be
tweaked, reinterpreted, or even scrapped altogether and rewrit-
ten.37  This was especially true during the twentieth century.  No
sooner was the 1909 Act enacted, for example, was it battling
obsolescence because it gave virtually no consideration to the
emerging motion picture industry.38
In 1911 the motion picture industry was sued for releasing Ben
35 JOYCE ET AL., supra  note 11, at 1. R
36 Copyright law was a response to the invention of printing with moveable type
in the fifteenth century, although it took more than two hundred years for the law to
catch up with that technology.  Response time has steadily improved since then. See
id. at 15.
37 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1A: A BRIEF HISTORY & OVERVIEW
(offering a brief overview of revisions to copyright law, for example, the addition of
photographs as a category of protected work in 1865 and the protection against un-
authorized public performance of music in 1897), available at http://
www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited Jan. 2005).
38 See LITMAN, supra  note 4, at 40-41. R
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Hur , a film based on a book by General Lew Wallace.39  The
copyright in the book was owned by Harper Brothers Publishing,
which argued that showing the movie was an infringement of its
copyright in the novel.40  Although the case settled after the Su-
preme Court held in favor of the publisher,41 the incident caused
an important shift in the movie industry; suddenly it was inter-
ested in copyright laws, which it argued needed amending.
Following the lawsuit over Ben Hur , the movie industry put
together a bill that was introduced in the House of Representa-
tives in January of 1912.42  Not surprisingly, the bill had many
critics, namely those copyright industries that were already suffi-
ciently represented by the 1909 Act.43  At hearings in front of the
House Patent Committee, interested groups met and pled their
cases, demonstrating little common ground.  As a solution, the
House encouraged the interested parties to negotiate privately
and return with what they thought would be a fair solution.  (In-
terestingly, this was the same strategy used to create the 1909
Act, which was rapidly showing its holes.)  The parties came to
an agreement in March of that same year and submitted their
proposal to the House; and despite concerns over some of the
proposals in the new bill, it was enacted with only minor
changes.44  Like the 1909 Act, for anyone present during negotia-
tions the amendment was satisfactory, while anyone absent
would have to take up the battle for their interests at a later
date.45
The example of the movie industry is more or less representa-
tive of subsequent copyright legislation.  As new technologies
and new mediums of expression rose to prominence, the law was
forced to either bend itself in a way that incorporated the new
technology or undergo amendment.  Moreover, as the pace of
advances in technology quickened throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, so too did the need for rethinking copyright.  Indeed, as one
commentator so aptly noted, “Copyright laws become obsolete
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See id . (citing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)).
42 LITMAN, supra note 4, at 40-41. R
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 The authors of nondramatic works, for example, were disadvantaged by the
new bill.  For a more detailed account of the motion picture industry’s entrance into
the world of copyright, as well as a thorough discussion on the history of copyright
legislation, see id .
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when technology renders the assumptions on which they were
based outmoded.”46  With copyright laws becoming increasingly
obsolete, therefore, Congress got in the habit of turning to the
then-represented copyright industries to hammer out the neces-
sary changes.47  While this may have appeared a sensible ap-
proach at the time—and certainly one that was easier on
representatives who were under pressure from the large copy-
right industries—it may have had negative, albeit unexpected,
consequences on the nature of copyright and the rights of the
public.
One such unexpected consequence of this method of drafting
legislation was an increase in the scope, subject matter, and
length of copyright.  When representatives from new industries
negotiate with established copyright owners like traditional pub-
lishers, there is one predictable feature of the process—the pub-
lishers are not going to give up something for nothing.48  This is
true of any group that currently has a stake in copyright law.  As
a result, copyright law has tended to become more specific, more
complex, and ultimately more confusing.  A simple example will
illustrate the point.
When the Walt Disney Corporation sought to extend the copy-
right term by twenty years due to the imminent threat of losing
Mickey Mouse to the public domain, it had to caress and appease
those (not including the public) for whom copyright extension
was not beneficial.49  Fortunately for Disney, copyright extension
was a plus factor for most of the players to the negotiations, who
by definition were mainly copyright owners, licensors, or licen-
sees.50  Nevertheless, copyright extension was not beneficial for
some:  libraries can make far more use of works in the public
domain and gain no additional benefit from extending the copy-
right term.51  Proponents of the longer term therefore granted
libraries an exemption to the proposed copyright extension.52
While this made representatives from the libraries happy (at least
happy enough to go along with the amendment), it did little for
members of the public, who saw their rights shrink in order to
46 LITMAN, supra note 7, at 22. R
47 See id.  at 23.
48 See id .
49 See id.  at 23-24.
50 Id.
51 Id.  at 24.
52 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000).
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accommodate the expanding rights of copyright owners.  What is
more, it is difficult to see how expanding the length of copyright
protection did anything to further copyright’s fundamental pur-
pose of promoting learning.
1. The 1976 Act
It is under this method of interest group wrangling that the
current copyright statute was born.  In 1955, sensing the inevita-
ble demise of a statute that had originally been drafted before
the advent of television or even radio, Congress authorized a
substantial revision project.53  Initially designed to take three
years, the revision process stretched out through hearings and re-
ports and negotiations and compromises for the next twenty-one
years.54  The number of industries with an interest in copyright
had grown considerably since the enactment of the 1909 Act, and
the process of allowing those groups to work it out amongst
themselves proved maddening.55  The resulting Act passed in
1976 bore some of the same hallmarks of its predecessor:  the
Act’s provisions spoke to the narrow interests of individual copy-
right owners rather than to the general guiding principles of cop-
yright.56  This was not surprising, though, given that “[o]f the
thirty-four separate studies prepared under the supervision of the
Copyright Office to provide necessary background for Congress,
not one of them focused on either the history or the philosophy
of copyright itself.”57
The Copyright Act of 1976 resembled the 1909 Act in another
way.  Just as the motion picture industry in 1910 had quickly re-
minded Congress of the importance of emerging technologies, so
too was Congress reminded of that importance after enacting the
1976 Act.  Somehow in over two decades of negotiations, nobody
had bothered to address another emerging industry—the com-
puter industry.58  The result, of course, was a revision of the Act
53 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 22. R
54 Id .  For an interesting and in depth account of the legislative process that led to
the Copyright Act of 1976, see Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technolog-
ical Change , 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989).
55 See LITMAN, supra note 4, at 54-57. R
56 See id.
57 PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra  note 15, at 91-92. R
58 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 24.  The House Committee reports accom- R
panying the 1976 Act referred to computer programs, yet they were not addressed in
the final legislation. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52-53 (1976), reprinted in  1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665-67.
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in 1980 designed to give protection to computer programs.59
Since then, the pace of amendments to the Copyright Act has
mirrored the increasingly rapid pace of technology, with numer-
ous amendments enacted in the last twenty years.
The 1976 Act is both narrower and at the same time more con-
voluted than the 1909 Act.  Under the original text of the 1976
Act, an author had the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute,
perform, and display his or her copyrighted work, as well as to
prepare derivative works.60  The House Report noted that “[t]he
approach of the bill is to set forth the copyright owner’s exclusive
rights in broad terms in section 106, and then to provide various
limitations, qualifications, or exemptions in the twelve sections
that follow.”61  Congress has since added a sixth exclusive right,
the right “in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”62
Moreover, Congress has expanded the number of limitations to
sixteen, so that the exclusive rights of section 106 are subject to,
and must be construed in accordance with, section 107 through
section 122.63
Many of the limitations promulgated in the statute are the re-
sult of the legislative process described above.  Section 108, for
instance, essentially gives libraries the ability to reproduce one
copy of a work for archival purposes.64  But that exception alone
takes several pages to enumerate.  Similarly, Congress enacted
section 119, the Satellite Home Viewer Act, in 1988 to deal with
the expanding satellite dish television industry65 because the ex-
ception that already existed to accommodate cable television
providers was drafted too narrowly to cover satellite transmis-
sions.66  The cable industry operated under a limited statutory
licensing scheme that permitted the providers to broadcast copy-
righted works.  Royalties collected from the cable industry were
then divided among copyright holders.  When copyright owners
sued satellite providers for distributing their copyrighted works,
59 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000).
60 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 106, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000)).
61 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976).
62 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).
63 Id . §§ 107-122.
64 Id . § 108.
65 Public L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949 (1988) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 119 (2000)).
66 See LITMAN, supra  note 4, at 58. R
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the satellite dish industry argued that it wanted to be included
under the cable television licensing scheme.  The cable industry,
of course, opposed the idea.  What resulted was another long and
largely incomprehensible statutory licensing scheme (more re-
strictive and expensive than the cable license scheme) dealing
only with satellite transmissions.67  The Satellite Home Viewer
Act is representative of subsequent legislation, which has in-
volved narrow exemptions being carved out to respond to new
technologies.  In the end, the 1976 Act enumerates an author’s
rights in less than one page, while the narrowly drafted excep-
tions, exemptions, and limitations to those rights take up more
than the next fifty.68
Despite the numerous limitations that are tailored so specifi-
cally as to favor only isolated interest groups, Congress did not,
in enacting the 1976 Act, hand over the reins completely to the
copyright-related industries.  Some provisions do in fact work to
serve the public good.  For example, Congress retained the idea-
expression dichotomy, stating explicitly that copyright does not
“extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of oper-
ation, concept, principle, or discovery.”69  The idea-expression di-
chotomy protects the public’s access to the facts and ideas
embodied in original works of authorship, which serves the con-
stitutional goal of promoting learning and enhancing the public
domain.  In section 103 of the Act, Congress reaffirmed this pre-
mise for compilations and derivative works.70  Section 103 speci-
fies that only those aspects of compilations and derivative works
original to the author are protected by copyright.71  Anything
else is open for public access and use.
Congress further protected the balance in copyright in section
202, which establishes that “[o]wnership of a copyright, or of any
of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from owner-
ship of any material object in which the work is embodied.”72
Thus, when you purchase a novel you are purchasing only the
67 See 17 U.S.C. § 119.  Congress later relaxed the restrictions on satellite trans-
missions and reduced the fees.   Intellectual Property & Communications Omnibus
Reform Act of 1999 §§ 1001-1010; Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (codi-
fied at 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 122 (2000)).
68 See  §§ 106-22.
69 Id . § 102(b).
70 See id.  § 103(b).
71 Id .
72 Id . § 202.
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material object, not any part of the copyright.  Conversely, the
owner of the copyright in the novel retains no control over the
material object, which you are free to use as you see fit, absent
infringement.  This idea is commonly referred to as the first sale
doctrine.
Still another public protection worked into the text of the Act,
and one of the most important, is the fair use exception.  Con-
gress codified the judicially created doctrine to guarantee that
copyrighted works could still be used, even copied, “for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”73
Fair use is an affirmative defense to infringement and serves as
an important limitation on the statutory monopoly granted to
copyright owners.74  As an “equitable rule of reason,”75 fair use
is determined on a case-by-case basis, with emphasis given to
four factors: “(1) the purpose and character of the use; . . . (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantial-
ity of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market.”76
No single factor is determinative, “[n]or may the four statutory
factors be treated in isolation, one from another.  All are to be
explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the pur-
poses of copyright.”77  Furthermore, by codifying the doctrine of
fair use, Congress meant only to restate the judicial doctrine al-
ready being used, “not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any
way.”78
2. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc.
Since Congress codified the fair use privilege, four major Su-
73 Id . § 107.  The origin of the fair use doctrine in the United States is usually
traced to Justice Story’s opinion in Folsom v. Marsh , 9 F. Cas. 342 (1841) (No. 4901).
Indeed, the factors courts are to consider today when determining whether a use was
fair are essentially those outlined by Justice Story, although they have been some-
what sharpened through subsequent decisions. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at R
841.
74 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (noting that
fair use has long been thought “necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘to pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.).
75 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984).
76 § 107(1)-(4).
77 Campbell , 510 U.S. at 578.
78 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in  1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
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preme Court decisions have addressed it.79  A brief look at the
first of these cases, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios,
Inc. , demonstrates the effectiveness and importance of the doc-
trine.80  In Sony , the owners of copyrights in various publicly
broadcast television programs, including Universal City Studios
and Walt Disney Productions, sued Sony Corporation for manu-
facturing and distributing the Betamax videotape recorder
(“VCR”).81  Purchasers of Sony’s VCR were recording television
programs to watch at their convenience, a process dubbed “time-
shifting.”82  Surveys showed that a substantial number of VCR
owners had amassed libraries of recorded tapes,83 meaning that
Sony’s VCRs were potentially facilitating millions of instances of
copyright infringement.  Therefore, rather than going after indi-
vidual infringers, Universal brought an action against Sony alleg-
ing contributory infringement.  Universal had the burden of
proving first that users of Sony’s VCR had infringed their copy-
rights, and second that Sony was responsible.84
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held in Sony’s
favor.  First, the majority held that personal home recording of
television programs for the purpose of time-shifting was fair
use.85  Universal had argued that such use of VCRs would have
serious negative economic effects on the television and motion
picture industries, but the Court instead relied on the district
court’s findings that “[h]arm from time-shifting [wa]s speculative
and, at best, minimal.”86  Next, the majority declared that under
the staple article of commerce doctrine, the seller of copying
equipment is not liable for contributory infringement if their
equipment is “capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”87  The
Court noted that it did not need to “explore all the different po-
tential uses of [Sony’s] machine,” only those considered by the
district court.88  Because the majority had agreed with the district
79 Campbell , 510 U.S. 569; Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony , 464 U.S. 417.
80 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
81 Id . at 419-20.  Note that the Supreme Court referred to the Betamax recorder
as a “VTR,” video tape recorder.  I have used the more familiar term “VCR.”
82 Id . at 423.
83 Id .
84 Id . at 434.
85 Id . at 454-55.
86 Id . at 454.
87 Id . at 442.
88 Id .
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court’s findings regarding the uses of Sony’s VCR, particularly
that individual VCR users had not infringed Universal’s copy-
rights, it held that the Betamax was capable of substantial nonin-
fringing uses.89
The Sony decision is notable for several reasons.  For one, it
affirmed the importance of the fair use doctrine under the 1976
Act.90  Copyright protection, the Court noted, does not give the
copyright owner control over every use of his or her work; a per-
son is still free to make fair uses of copyrighted works absent the
author’s permission.91  The Sony decision also illustrates some
difficult issues that arise when figuring out how copyright law
should handle new technologies.  The motion picture industry
had fought bitterly to stave off the emergence of home videocas-
sette technology, arguing that it would be the death knell for
movies.  Indeed, Jack Valenti, long time president and CEO of
the Motion Picture Association of America, warned that
“[l]etting the videocassette recorder into the United States would
be like letting the Boston Strangler into the room with a young
woman.”92  He was, of course, wrong.  In fact, the exact opposite
proved to be the case.  Today video sales and rentals account for
three-quarters of the movie industry’s income.93
Sony demonstrates, therefore, that industries do not always
have the foresight to know what is best for themselves, let alone
the public.94  For that reason, the congressional practice of al-
lowing copyright-related industries to work out the copyright
laws amongst themselves can only work if Congress ensures that
broad limiting doctrines (fair use, idea-expression) remain intact
and available.  The 1976 Act proved resilient enough to handle
the advent of VCRs.  It also managed to protect the public’s right
of limited access and use of copyrighted works.  With the rise of
digital technology in the 1990s, however, the viability of the Act
was again in question.
89 Id .
90 See id.  at 432-33.
91 Id .
92 John Perry Barlow, Intellectual Property, Information Age , in COPY FIGHTS,
supra  note 4, at 37, 39.
93 Id .
94 Copyright-related industries have more than once cried wolf.  The publishing
industry, for example, claimed (incorrectly) that it was doomed due to the rise of
photocopiers. See  Stan Liebowitz, Copyright in the Post-Napster World: Legal or
Market Solutions? , in COPY FIGHTS, supra  note 4, at 197, 199.
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III
THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) represents
the logical conclusion of privately negotiated copyright legisla-
tion.  The interests of those who were at the bargaining table are
manifold, intertwined, and solidly protected, while the interests
of those absent from the table have been marginalized.  The final
version of the statute is the product of a four-year, dizzyingly
complex multiparty negotiation, which contains “no overarching
vision of the public interest.”95  In our hypothesized junior high
science class from section II, the DMCA is the jumbo one hun-
dred-gram weight which that one beefy kid, not a big fan of sci-
ence anyway, just had to throw on the scale.  And without
enough smaller weights carefully situated on the other side to
offset its girth, the one hundred-gram piece predictably crashed
onto the countertop, sending all of the smaller pieces already on
the balance into disarray.  Of course, then the question became:
Who picks up the pieces?
Perhaps a better way to think of the DMCA is as an overreac-
tion.  With the rise of digital technology in the early 1990s, the
current major copyright holders, like the movie industry and the
recording industry, were panicked.  This was understandable to
some extent, given that works in digital format could be repro-
duced almost endlessly for little cost and with no degradation in
quality.  Historically, works had been protected by the prohibi-
tive cost of reproduction.  Not so anymore.  In response to these
concerns, the Clinton Administration in 1993 appointed the In-
formation Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) to explore the digital
environment and to develop a workable policy.96  Two years later
the IITF produced its findings in Intellectual Property and the Na-
tional Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights , or what is commonly re-
95 JESSICA LITMAN, The Bargaining Table , in DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra  note 4, R
at 122, 144-45; see also SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS & COPYWRONGS:  THE
RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 159
(2001) (“The White Paper paid no attention to the public interest concerns of the
copyright system.”).
96 BRUCE A. LEHMAN (CHAIRMAN), INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUC-
TURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 1 (1995), available at  http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ com/doc/ipnii/
ipnii.pdf.
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ferred to as the “White Paper.”97
In the White Paper, the Working Group began by noting that
“[e]nsuring consumer access to and enjoyment of both copy-
righted works and new technologies is an attainable goal.”98  As
proof of this, it cited the Sony  Betamax decision.99  Indeed, it
would take “no more than minor clarification and limited
amendment” of the Copyright Act, merely some “fine tuning,” to
bring the Act up to speed with current technology.100   Despite
such optimistic beginnings, the proposals supported in the White
Paper ensured neither access to nor enjoyment of copyrighted
works.  Rather than fine-tuning the Act, the White Paper’s rec-
ommendations entailed a major overhaul that granted sweeping
new rights to authors to control their works, while diminishing
the rights of the public.101  The general reasoning behind the
White Paper was that copyright owners would not make their
material available in digital format without hearty technological
and legal protections in place.102  Ostensibly, then, to promote
the progress of science and useful arts, content providers needed
to be able to install digital locks, backed by the force of law.103
Based in part on the recommendations put forth in the White
Paper, Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998.104  The statute is
comprised of five titles.  Title I implements two treaties of the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO):  the Copy-
right Treaty and the Performances and Phonogram Treaty.105  Ti-
97 Id .
98 Id . at 11.  The White Paper also specifically claims as its goal “maintain[ing] the
existing balance” of copyright law. Id . at 14.
99 Id . at 11.
100 Id . at 17.
101 For a detailed account of how the Clinton Administration, through the IITF,
grabbed hold of and marshaled into being the “Information Superhighway,” see JES-
SICA LITMAN, Copyright Lawyers Set Out to Colonize Cyberspace , in DIGITAL COP-
YRIGHT, supra  note 4, at 89. R
102 See  Drew Clark, How Copyright Became Controversial , in COPY FIGHTS,
supra note 4, at 147, 147 (2002). R
103 See id.
104 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 114, 512, 1201-05 (2000)).  More information on the history
of the DMCA can be found on the Digital Future Coalition’s website, at  http://
www.dfc.org/dfc1/Active_Issues/graphic/DMCA_index.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2005).
105 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-05 (2000); see Statement by President William J. Clinton
Upon Signing H.R. 2281 (“This Act implements two landmark treaties that were
successfully negotiated by my Administration in 1996.”), reprinted in 1998
U.S.C.C.A.N. 671, 671 [hereinafter President Clinton].
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tle II establishes safe harbors for online service providers.106
Title III allows for temporary copies of computer programs to be
made during maintenance or repair,107 while Title IV of the Act
contains miscellaneous provisions, including limitations on exclu-
sive rights to support distance education and amendments to en-
able internet broadcasting.108  The last one, Title V, protects
original boat hull designs.109  This Comment will focus primarily
on the first two titles.
Each of the two WIPO treaties implemented by the Act called
for protection against circumvention of technological measures
used to protect digital works.110  Accordingly, the DMCA added
Chapter 12 to Title 17 of the United States Code, the controver-
sial anti-circumvention provisions.111  Section 1201 prevents the
circumvention of technological measures that control access to
copyrighted works.112  The statute also prohibits trafficking in
technology that allows circumvention of both access controls and
controls that protect the rights of the author (use controls),113 but
only if the technology is primarily designed to circumvent such
controls,114 has otherwise limited commercial purposes,115 or is
marketed as a circumvention tool.116  Thus, while trafficking in
circumvention tools that enable access or  use is illegal, only cir-
cumventing access controls is prohibited.  In theory, by not
prohibiting the circumvention of use controls, Congress intended
to leave room to make fair or other noninfringing uses of pro-
tected works.  In practice, because the statute does not define
106 17 U.S.C. § 512.
107 Id . § 117.
108 Id.  § 701, 112, 108.
109 Id . § 1301.
110 World Intellectual Property Organization: Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,
available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo033en.htm; World Intellectual
Property Organization: Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, availa-
ble at  http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo034en.htm.
111 Upon signing the bill into law, President Clinton reaffirmed that one of the
primary purposes of the DMCA was to provide adequate protection and effective
remedies against circumvention so that copyright owners could protect their works.
Piracy on a global scale, he noted, was possible “with a single keystroke.”  Still, he
assured that the Act’s provisions had been designed by “carefully balancing the in-
terests of both copyright owners and users.”  President Clinton, supra  note 105, at
671.  It is this latter proposition that has been questioned and hotly debated.
112 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
113 § 1201(a)(2)-(b).
114 §§ 1201(a)(2)(A), (b)(1)(A).
115 §§ 1201(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)(B).
116 §§ 1201(a)(2)(C), (b)(1)(C).
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“access,” content owners can regulate the use of their works by
requiring users to get permission to access the work every time it
is consulted.117  Thus, “the ‘access/use’ distinction tends to col-
lapse under pressure.”118
Furthermore, the general limitations on copyright owners
under the 1976 Act apparently do not apply to Chapter 12.119  It
does not matter, for example, if you circumvent an access control
to make a fair use of a work—it is still a violation of section 1201.
Only the limited exceptions written into Chapter 12 apply.  These
exceptions include, for instance, reverse engineering to achieve
interoperability,120 browsing for potential purchases on the part
of schools and libraries,121 as well as exceptions for encryption
research122 and computer security testing.123  Whereas traditional
copyright law provided remedies solely for acts of infringement,
Chapter 12 provides remedies regardless of whether any infringe-
ment has taken place.  As such, it is not technically copyright leg-
islation, but rather, as many have dubbed it, “paracopyright.”124
The potential exists under paracopyright legislation for content
owners to effectively lock up their works against any use unless
specifically authorized and, perhaps, purchased.  Aside from be-
ing a direct affront on the public’s traditional rights, granting au-
thors such absolute control is more likely to stifle the creation of
new works and the enhancement of the public sphere.
The abandonment of fair use under Chapter 12 is not a given,
though.  In fact, Congress apparently thought it was ensuring the
survival of the doctrine by requiring the Library of Congress to
periodically conduct rulemaking proceedings to assess the effect
of the anti-circumvention provisions on the ability of individuals
to make noninfringing uses.125  Section 1201(a)(1)(B) actually
states that the anti-circumvention provisions will not apply if
117 See JOYCE ET AL., supra  note 11, at 814. R
118 Id.
119 See Jeff Sharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act Enables Digital Content Owners to Circumvent Educational Fair Use ,
40 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 36 (2002) (noting that legislative history and judicial interpreta-






124 See, e.g. , JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 813 (“Chapter 12 is not copyright R
legislation . . . .  Rather, it is what has been termed ‘paracopyright’ legislation.”).
125 § 1201(a)(1)(C).
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people are adversely affected in their ability to make noninfring-
ing uses of copyrighted works.  Section 1201(c)(1) further pro-
vides that fair use is not affected under the statute.  Moreover,
legislative history demonstrates that Congress was concerned
over the potential of the DMCA to negate fair use and create a
pay-per-view society.126  The original draft of the legislation gave
no thought to fair use, yet Congress made two important
changes.127  First, it eliminated the word “use” from section
1201(a) in order to make clear that “users could circumvent such
measures in order to make fair use copies.”128  Second, it in-
cluded a savings clause ensuring that defenses such as fair use
were not affected by the prohibitions on circumvention.129  These
changes were meant to guarantee that technology would not be
used to lock up information and to “ensure that consumers . . .
[would] be able to continue to exercise their historical fair use
rights.”130  Still, even despite Congress’s concerns and its attempt
to do otherwise, fair use appears to have been elbowed out of
Chapter 12.
Title II of the DMCA has also been the subject of some con-
troversy.  The safe harbor provisions of Title II grew out of in-
tense lobbying from Internet service providers such as AOL and
local public libraries, each of which foresaw potential liability
under what was then emerging as the DMCA.131  For example,
the service providers were concerned that temporary reproduc-
tions of digital works made and transmitted through their servers
and routers would open them up to infringement suits, or like-
wise with the infringing conduct of their customers.132  To as-
suage their fears and ensure that the Internet would continue to
126 Early drafts of the anti-circumvention provisions were discarded due to fair
use concerns.  In referring to the earlier drafts, Senator John Ashcroft remarked:
“[T]his section would have established a flat prohibition on the circumvention of
technological protection measures to gain access to works for any purpose, and thus
raised the specter of moving our Nation towards a ‘pay-per-use’ society.”  144 CONG.
REC. S11887 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998).  For additional discussion about Congress’s fair
use concerns when enacting the DMCA, see Sharp, supra note 119, at 36-42. R




130 144 CONG. REC. H7094 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Thomas J.
Bliley, Jr.).
131 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 793. R
132 Id .
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flourish, Congress added Title II of the DMCA, which gives In-
ternet service providers safe harbor in four situations.
First, section 512(a) protects a service provider from liability
arising out of any transmissions of infringing material, provided
that someone else made the transmission, it was carried out auto-
matically without selection by the service provider, and the ser-
vice provider did not choose its recipients.133  Next, section
512(b) protects service providers from liability for temporarily
storing infringing material so long as it is done automatically and
the service provider complies with certain notice-and-take-down
procedures.134   Section 512(c) essentially limits liability for Web
hosting.  Under this provision a service provider must not know
the material it is “hosting” is infringing,135 and must be unable to
control what is posted or receive any direct financial benefit from
it.136  And finally, section 512(d) provides that a service provider
is not liable for referring or linking its customers to an online
location containing infringing material or infringing activity, ab-
sent actual knowledge or financial benefit.137  For any of these
safe harbor provisions to apply, a defendant must qualify as a
“service provider” under the statute and must act expeditiously
to take infringing material down upon its discovery.  These last
two requirements have been the subject of several cases so far, in
part because the definition of “service provider” is quite
broad.138
IV
APPLYING THE DMCA: FROM ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION
TO PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING
In its relatively short life, the DMCA has been the source of
numerous conflicts and debates.  This section will explore two of
them:  the debate over the anti-circumvention provisions; and the
debate over peer-to-peer file sharing.  By examining relevant
case law, this Comment aims to demonstrate that the DMCA has
been stretched beyond its initial intentions and has upset the
traditional balance in copyright law.  Cases involving the anti-cir-




137 §§ 512(d)(1)(A), (2).
138 “[T]he term ‘service provider’ means a provider of online services or network
access, or the operator of facilities therefore.”  § 512(k)(1)(B).
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cumvention provisions demonstrate that the DMCA, as applied,
is having a negative effect on the rights of the public, particularly
its right to make fair uses of copyrighted works; yet cases involv-
ing peer-to-peer systems are perhaps more troubling.  Although
the peer-to-peer cases have thus far hardly touched on the actual
provisions of the DMCA, the effects of the statute are plainly
evident in that the rights of copyright owners have taken a front
seat to nearly everyone else.
Fortunately, there may be a dim light climbing the horizon.
Courts have been quick to enforce the anti-trafficking provisions
of section 1201, denying many arguments of fair use, but the
question has yet to be addressed in relation to circumventing an
access control to make a fair, noninfringing use.  That leaves
open the possibility for additional judicial interpretation that
could reverse the current trend.139  Furthermore, while cases in-
volving peer-to-peer file sharing have resulted in several victories
for copyright owners and have cast doubt on the Sony  doctrine’s
applicability to the digital world, a recent Ninth Circuit decision
has marked a change.140  If the United States Supreme Court,
which recently heard oral arguments in the case, agrees with the
Ninth Circuit, it may indicate that some small weights are again
being placed on the balance opposite the DMCA.
A. Anti-Circumvention: Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley
Concerned with the potential for mass duplication and in-
fringement made possible by DVD technology in the mid-1990s,
several major motion picture studios sought an encryption mech-
anism to protect their copyrighted works.141  The result, in 1996,
was the Content Scramble System (CSS).142  After securing what
they hoped was adequate protection for their films, the studios
then arranged, under a comprehensive licensing scheme, to dis-
tribute the necessary decryption technology to those DVD player
manufacturers who promised to limit their machines’ capabilities
139 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 947 (“The prospect remains . . . that courts R
will be called upon to invent a new exceptional doctrine (as, once upon a time, they
invented ‘fair use’) rooted in constitutional values of free expression and specifically
applicable to ‘paracopyright.’”) (citing David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act , 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000)).
140 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
141 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir. 2001).
142 Id.
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to merely playing DVDs.143  In 1999, Jon Johansen, a teenager in
Norway working with two other unidentified individuals, reverse-
engineered a licensed DVD player and wrote a decryption pro-
gram (DeCSS) which allowed them to bypass CSS.144  The pro-
gram allowed users to play DVDs on non-compliant players
(such as those running the LINUX operating system) and to po-
tentially copy the DVDs onto their hard drive, enabling them to
then further copy, manipulate, and transmit the file.145  Defen-
dant Eric Corley, whose company 2600 Enterprises, Inc. main-
tained a website geared towards hackers, posted the DeCSS
program along with links to other websites containing the pro-
gram.146  In response, the movie studios brought an action under
Chapter 12 of the DMCA.
The district court entered a permanent injunction against Cor-
ley, prohibiting him from posting the program or knowingly link-
ing to it.147  Judge Kaplan acknowledged that the CSS encryption
system could prevent noninfringing uses of copyrighted works,
but noted that such was the intent of Congress.148  “[T]he legisla-
tive history,” he wrote, “demonstrates [that] the decision not to
make fair use a defense to a claim under section 1201(a) was
quite deliberate.”149  While his assertion regarding legislative in-
tent is debatable,150 Judge Kaplan may have properly deduced
the reality of the legislation; a violation of section 1201(a) occurs
regardless of infringement, thus fair use—an affirmative defense
to infringement—is inapplicable.  Furthermore, Judge Kaplan
declined to apply the Sony  doctrine of substantial noninfringing
uses to an action under section 1201.151  The doctrine was appli-
143 Id . at 436-37.
144 Id . at 437; see also Sharp, supra  note 119, at 47-48 (“The early versions of R
DeCSS consisted of less than 60 lines of common computer instructions.  It has now
been reduced to seven lines of instructions in the Perl computer language—small
enough to be printed and distributed on a traditional business card.”) (citing Declan
McCullagh, Descramble that DVD in 7 Lines , WIRED NEWS, Mar. 7, 2001, at http://
www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,42259,00.html).
145 Corley , 273 F.3d at 437-38.
146 Id . at 435.
147 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 346 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).  Following Judge Kaplan’s order, numerous people began distributing DeCSS
in other manners such as printing the code on T-shirts, publishing the court docu-
ments, putting it in Haikus or setting it to music, and publishing the code in plain
English.  Sharp, supra  note 119, at 52. R
148 Reimerdes , 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
149 Id .
150 See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
151 Reimerdes , 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23.
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cable to a Copyright Act that was overruled by the DMCA to the
extent that there were any inconsistencies, and it did not apply to
circumvention violations.152  The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed Judge Kaplan’s decision.153
In his defense at the appellate level, Corley alleged that (1) the
duration of copyright protection under the DMCA oversteps lim-
its set forth in the Copyright Clause, (2) as applied to his case the
DMCA violates the First Amendment because computer code is
protected “speech” and the statute fails under the appropriate
scrutiny, and (3) “the DMCA violates the First Amendment and
the Copyright Clause by unduly obstructing the ‘fair use’ of copy-
righted materials.”154  Specifically, Corley alleged that since he
had purchased a legitimate copy of a DVD, he was free to then
bypass the digital lock to view the DVD on an alternate format.
That is, because he had purchased the DVD, he was not circum-
venting an access control and was merely circumventing a use
control in order to make a fair use.  This Comment will explore
primarily Corley’s third constitutional challenge.  As for the first
challenge, the court declined to decide the issue, leaving open the
possibility that in a future case the “limited times” language of
the Copyright Clause may be found in conflict with the potential
under the DMCA for perpetual protection through the use of
technological measures.155  Moreover, the second challenge was
rejected by the court, which held that, although computer code is
in fact protected speech, the regulation was content-neutral and
the DMCA passed intermediate scrutiny.156
The Second Circuit began its analysis of Corley’s third chal-
lenge by noting that the Supreme Court had never held fair use
to be a constitutional requirement, even though many of its state-
ments support such a conclusion.157  Regardless of this fact, how-
ever, the court refused to fully address the issue.158  First of all,
Corley had not claimed to be making fair use of any copyright-
protected materials.159  Second, the evidence regarding the im-
pact of anti-trafficking provisions on users seeking to make fair
152 Id .
153 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2001).
154 Id . at 436.
155 Id.  at 444-45.
156 Id . at 453-54.
157 Id.  at 458.
158 See id .
159 Id.  at 458-59.
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use was “scanty and fail[ed] adequately to address the issues.”160
Third, the court could find no authority supporting Corley’s pro-
position that fair use requires the ability to copy by the optimum
method, that is, in digital format.161  Importantly, the court found
that the DMCA does not impose a limitation on the ability to
make a number of traditional fair uses of DVD movies.162  One
could still criticize their content, quote from them, or even record
portions of video or sound by traditional analog means.163  The
fact that such means would result in a less perfect or less manage-
able copy was not enough to raise a question as to the constitu-
tionality of the provision.164
Although the court was quick to reject Corley’s fair use de-
fense, it did so only in regard to the anti-trafficking provisions.
Corley did not circumvent the CSS program; he was simply dis-
tributing DeCSS over his website.  Moreover, the anti-trafficking
provisions are arguably inappropriate for a fair use defense be-
cause, technically, they are not dealing with copyright.  By limit-
ing its holding to the anti-trafficking provisions, the court
appeared to be talking past Corley.  That is, the court did not
decide the issue in regards to a violation of section 1201(a), the
anti-circumvention provision, even though Corley had framed his
argument around that section.  By doing so, the court left the
matter open for another day.
In the end, the disjunction between the congressional assertion
that fair use remains viable under the DMCA and the fact that a
violation occurs even absent infringement (and possibly even
when access is lawfully obtained) means courts will likely be ad-
dressing the issue of fair use again under the statute.  This leaves
open the possibility that fair use may yet find its way into the
DMCA.  Also, the disjunction has not escaped Congress’s atten-
tion.  Pending legislation, discussed in the next section, demon-
strates that some members of Congress are ready to revisit the
issue in an attempt to restore balance.
160 Id . at 459 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d
294, 338 n.246 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
161 Corley , 273 F.3d at 459.
162 Id.
163 One example the court gave was pointing a camcorder at a television screen to
record the movie. Id .
164 Id .
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B. Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
At the time the DMCA was enacted, the recording industry
had yet to acquire a leak-proof online format for its works.165
Refusing to surrender its content to an uncertain environment,
the industry instead watched as increasing bandwidth and file-
compression technology combined to fuel a surge in online file
sharing.166  The leading format for these works was the popular
MP3.  Ironically, many of the MP3 files being downloaded and
uploaded were those the industry so fiercely wanted to protect,
which is to say, its copyrighted songs.  Not surprisingly, the re-
cording industry responded by trying to shut down anything
MP3-related.167  Anyone using the format was a target.  The in-
dustry went after the manufacturer of the portable Rio MP3
player, for example, even before the product was available.168
Yet when the Ninth Circuit declared the case against Rio merit-
less and held that the device merely allowed space-shifting, which
was a permissible fair use under the Copyright Act,169 the stage
was set for the proliferation of peer-to-peer systems.
The most successful of the initial peer-to-peer systems was, of
course, Napster.  With over seventy million users at its peak,170
Napster raised more than a few eyebrows; clearly copyrighted
works were being shared over its system.  But there was a hitch:
Napster did not make copies of any copyrighted works on any of
its servers.171  Instead, it merely received requests from users,
searched its index for a match, and if a match was found, con-
nected the two computers.172  For this reason, the action against
Napster (and later other peer-to-peer systems) was based on con-
tributory infringement and vicarious liability.173
To be liable for contributory or vicarious infringement, there
must be actual infringement.174  Thus, as a threshold matter, a
165 JESSICA LITMAN, The Copyright Wars , in DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra  note 4, R
at 154.
166 Id . at 154-55.
167 Id .
168 See  Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180
F.3d 1072, 1073 (9th Cir. 1999).
169 Id . at 1079, 1081.
170 David G. Post, His Napster’s Voice , in COPY FIGHTS, supra  note 4, at 107.
171 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001).
172 This is an extremely simplified explanation of the process.  For more detail, see
Judge Beezer’s opinion. Id .
173 Id . at 1019.
174 See id.  at 1019-20.
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plaintiff must first show ownership of a valid copyright, and sec-
ond, that a defendant violated one of the exclusive rights of sec-
tion 106.175  Once actual infringement is shown, a plaintiff must,
to succeed on a claim of contributory infringement, show that a
defendant (1) knew or had reason to know of the direct infringe-
ment, and (2) induced, caused, or materially contributed to it.176
On the other hand, to be found vicariously liable for copyright
infringement a defendant need not have knowledge of the in-
fringing activity.177  Vicarious infringement is shown if the defen-
dant (1) had the right and ability to supervise the infringing
activity, and (2) received direct financial benefit from it.178
1. Early-Generation File Sharing: A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc.
Created in 1999 by a college freshman in his dorm room, Nap-
ster grew to more than twenty million members in under two
years.  By July 2000 it was attracting more visitors than the web-
sites of ESPN, Disney, MSNBC, and Priceline.179  College stu-
dents and others were sharing music over the Internet in
astounding numbers.  Predictably, the recording industry, along
with artists like Metallica and Dr. Dre, sought an immediate in-
junction, alleging Napster was liable for contributory and vicari-
ous infringement.  The district court granted the motion.180
In upholding the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit
made reference to the architecture of Napster’s system in order
to promote an understanding of the general mechanics in-
volved.181  For that same reason, a basic description is useful
here.  In short, to use Napster’s system a user had to download
the MusicShare software available at Napster’s website, register
with the system, and create a user name and password.182  Many
of Napster’s users also created a “user library” on their hard
drive which stored MP3 files that would be accessible to other
175 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
176 Napster , 239 F.3d at 1019-20.
177 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
178 Napster , 239 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
179 Sharp, supra note 119, at 55. R
180 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
181 Napster , 239 F.3d at 1011-13.
182 Id. at 1011.
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users.183  When a user logged onto the system, the MusicShare
software searched his or her user library for properly formatted
MP3 files and uploaded the names of those files onto the Napster
servers where they became part of a collective directory of avail-
able files.184  By entering either a song name or the name of an
artist, users could search the Napster directory.  To transfer files,
the Napster server would then essentially connect the two users’
computers, without any of the content ever being stored on Nap-
ster’s servers.185   Despite not storing the files themselves, Nap-
ster did have the ability to block individual users or files from the
system.186
On appeal, Napster essentially acknowledged that some copy-
righted works were being traded, but claimed that its users were
making fair uses of the works by either sampling, space-shifting,
or engaging in permissive uses.187  The court disagreed, relying in
part on the district court’s analysis of the four factors from sec-
tion 107.188  First, continuous exploitive copying was a commer-
cial use, regardless of whether Napster received direct financial
benefit.189  Second, when considering the fourth fair use factor,
the potential harm to the market, both present and future mar-
kets should be considered.190  The lack of a current market can-
not deprive copyright owners of the ability to create alternative
markets.191  Further, the court rejected Napster’s claim that sam-
pling was a fair use.192  Regardless of whether sampling had actu-
ally increased CD sales, it still deprived the copyright owner the
right to license the material.193  Similarly, Napster’s space-shift-
ing argument failed because its users were not merely making
private copies, but were simultaneously distributing the file to
millions of potential users.194  In this way, the court distinguished
183 Id . at 1011-12.
184 Id . at 1012.
185 Id .
186 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1044 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
187 Napster , 239 F.3d at 1014.
188 Id . at 1019.
189 Id . at 1015.
190 Id . at 1017.
191 Id .
192 Id . at 1019.
193 Id . at 1018.  The court noted the example of a film producer’s using an un-
known song without permission. Id .  Despite the fact that the song becomes a com-
mercial success for its composer, the producer’s use was still not fair. Id .
194 Id . at 1019.
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both the Diamond  case regarding the Rio MP3 player and Sony ,
both of which allegedly involved only private copying for per-
sonal use.195
After determining that Napster’s users did not have a fair use
defense, the court went on to consider whether Napster was lia-
ble for contributory or vicarious infringement.  In regard to con-
tributory infringement, the court again referred to the Sony
decision, but found it unhelpful for Napster.196  While the court
refused, in light of Sony , to impute the necessary level of knowl-
edge to Napster merely because its system was capable of infring-
ing uses, and while it disagreed with the district court’s finding
that Napster failed to show substantial noninfringing uses, the
court nevertheless held that Napster had actual knowledge of the
infringing activity coupled with the ability to stop it.197  Thus,
Napster could be held liable for contributory infringement be-
cause it knew of the infringement and materially contributed to it
by providing the space and facilities.198
The court also held that the plaintiffs had shown a likelihood
of success on the merits regarding Napster’s vicarious infringe-
ment.199  The “staple article of commerce” analysis from Sony
did not apply to claims of vicarious infringement.200  Although
the Supreme Court had used the terms contributory and vicari-
ous liability interchangeably, its analysis, the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned, was applicable only to contributory infringement.201
Vicarious liability had not been an issue before the Court.202
With Sony  out of the way, the court went on to assess Napster’s
supervision and financial benefit.203  Napster received direct fi-
195 Id .
196 Id . at 1020.
197 Id . at 1020-22.
198 Id . at 1022.
199 Id . at 1024.
200 Id . at 1022.
201 Id . at 1022-23.  The court’s reasoning on this point is debatable.  In fact, forty
intellectual property and technology law professors believe the court’s position is
unsupported. See  Brief Amici Curiae of Forty Intellectual Property and Technology
Law Professors Supporting Affirmance at 2-3 n.2, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (No. 03-55894, 03-56236 & 03-55901).
The Ninth Circuit cited Nimmer’s copyright treatise when limiting Sony to contribu-
tory infringement, yet the treatise does not support such a conclusion.  Moreover,
that the Supreme Court used contributory and vicarious infringement interchangea-
bly in Sony  means the decision should apply to both.
202 Napster , 239 F.3d at 1022.
203 Id . at 1023-24.
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nancial benefit because its revenues were tied to the amount of
users trading files, and the availability of copyrighted works at-
tracted customers.204  Moreover, because Napster had the ability
to block infringing files, it was required to do so to the fullest
extent, and failure to police its “premises” meant Napster was
vicariously liable.205
As for the DMCA, the court brushed aside the issue of
whether Napster was sheltered by one of the safe harbor provi-
sions in section 512, yet expressly left the possibility open.206  The
issue, the court noted, would be more developed at trial.207
Questions remained as to whether Napster qualified as an In-
ternet service provider, whether copyright owners must serve of-
ficial notice, and whether Napster met the requirement of
establishing a detailed compliance policy.208  Still, despite its rela-
tively small stage time in the court’s decision, the DMCA un-
doubtedly had an effect.  This is because the DMCA, as least as it
has been thus far interpreted, marked a shift in copyright policy;
the priority of the law is not so much to balance competing inter-
ests as it is to protect copyright owners, at least in respect to digi-
tal works.  Under the DMCA there are content owners and there
are pirates, and the law has, of course, historically disfavored the
latter.209
2. Current File-Sharing Litigation: MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.
In March 2005, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in
another peer-to-peer controversy, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grok-
ster, Ltd.210  As of this writing the Court has not released its
opinion, but if the Supreme Court affirms the Ninth Circuit’s de-
cision affirming the district court’s granting of partial summary
judgment in favor of Grokster, it may revitalize the Sony  doc-
204 Id . at 1023 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64
(9th Cir. 1996)).
205 Id .
206 Id . at 1025 (“We need not accept a blanket conclusion that § 512 of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act will never protect secondary infringers.”).
207 Id .
208 Id.
209 One of Disney’s newer productions, Pirates of the Caribbean  (2003), illustrates
the point:  Johnny Depp, like all pirates, is a much-reviled scallywag.
210 Oral Argument, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., available at  http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-480.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 19, 2005).
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trine for the digital age and mark a subtle victory for users
everywhere.
Grokster  involved three defendant file-sharing services, Grok-
ster, StreamCast, and KaZaa, whose cases were consolidated for
pretrial purposes.211  The defendant’s file-sharing systems, while
similar in some respects, are not identical.  Grokster utilizes Fast-
Track technology (which it licenses from another company) that
is conceptually similar to Napster, yet Grokster has no access to
the source code and cannot change the application.212  Nor does
Grokster utilize a centralized server like Napster.213  Instead, the
program is based on a system of nodes and supernodes which
operate independently of Grokster’s control.214  Unlike Napster,
then, Grokster’s users can share files without sending any infor-
mation through any computers owned by Grokster.215  Stream-
Cast’s Morpheus technology is even more decentralized than
Grokster’s and is based on the open-source Gnutella platform.216
Rather than using supernodes, the Gnutella software connects
users directly; search queries are passed from user to user until a
match is found.217  As a proprietary system, however, Stream-
Cast can access the source code and modify its software.218
The differences between the Grokster and StreamCast systems
and the Napster system were sufficient to preclude liability for
contributory and vicarious infringement in the district court.  The
court began its analysis by noting that the direct infringement
element of both vicarious and contributory liability was satis-
211 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (C.D. Cal.
2003).  KaZaa stopped defending the action and the district court entered a default
judgment against it.  Thus, the decision addresses only Grokster and StreamCast.
Id . at 1032 n.2.
212 Id . at 1039-40.
213 Id . at 1039.
214 “A ‘node’ is an end-point on the Internet, typically a user’s computer.  A
‘supernode’ is a node that has a heightened function, accumulating information from
numerous other nodes.” Id . at 1040.  When users start their program, their com-
puter searches out a supernode; this process results in a cluster of nodes around a
supernode. Id .
215 Id .
216 Id . at 1041.  On the same day oral arguments were heard in the case, Stream-
Cast released another version of the Morpheus software which operates on both the
FastTrack and Gnutella networks. See Kevin Doran, Morpheus Wakes . . . &
Stretches  (Feb. 6, 2004), at http://kevindoran.com/denews/news/n040206.html (on file
with author).
217 Grokster , 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041.
218 Id.
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fied.219  There was no dispute as to whether some users of de-
fendants’ software were trading copyrighted works.220  To be
liable for contributory or vicarious infringement, therefore, de-
fendants needed only to have fit the remaining elements of those
claims.
For contributory infringement, the defendants must have
known of the infringing activity and materially contributed to
it.221  Following Sony , the court stated that knowledge of infring-
ing activity must be actual, not constructive.222  Simply because a
device is capable of infringing uses does not mean the manufac-
turer of the device is liable for infringement.223  Further, the
court emphasized a temporal limitation on the knowledge and
material contribution requirements—that a defendant must have
actual knowledge of infringement during a time when the defen-
dant can do something about it.224  For example, a landlord is not
liable for the infringing acts of tenants unless the landlord knew
at the time the lease was signed that the premises would be used
for infringing activities.225  In the same way, Grokster and
StreamCast could not be held liable for contributory infringe-
ment because neither had done anything to facilitate their users’
infringing activities, save providing the software, and neither
could do anything to stop the infringing activities at the time they
were taking place.226
The court also held that the defendants were not vicariously
liable for their users’ infringing activities.227  Although both
Grokster and StreamCast received substantial financial benefit
from the acts of their users, the first element of vicarious in-
fringement, they did not have the right and ability to supervise
their users’ infringing conduct.228  Napster’s users had been re-
quired to register with the system, giving Napster the ability to
block infringing users or files.  As such, Napster had a duty to
219 Id . at 1035.
220 Id . at 1034-35.
221 Id . at 1035.
222 Id . at 1036.
223 The court accepted that defendants’ software was capable of substantial nonin-
fringing uses under Sony . Id.  at 1035.
224 See id.  at 1036.
225 Id . at 1037 (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp 1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
226 Id . at 1041-42.
227 Id . at 1045-46.
228 Id . at 1045.
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police its users.229  Grokster and StreamCast, on the other hand,
had no ability to police their users; their decentralized peer-to-
peer systems essentially relieved them of the duty, and precluded
their being held vicariously liable.230  Although the district court
acknowledged the distinct possibility that Grokster and Stream-
Cast had intentionally structured their systems to avoid secon-
dary liability, it reasoned that the proper forum for such
considerations was the legislature.231
Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit was also concerned
with the application of the Sony  doctrine to digital technologies.
Indeed, at oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit, Judge Noo-
nan came right out questioning the recording industry’s attor-
neys:  “Everything you said could have been applied to Sony,” he
said, “so what’s the difference?”232  Reports indicate that the
judges continued emphasizing the Sony decision throughout the
proceeding, with responses from the recording industry’s lawyers
sounding eerily reminiscent of the motion picture industry’s law-
yers.233  For example, Russell Frackman, attorney for the record-
ing industry, argued that peer-to-peer software creators should
have teamed up with the recording industry to install technologi-
cal protections against infringement.234  Compare that statement
with the motion picture industry’s lawyer in Sony , who said:
“The real way for Sony to have avoided this problem would have
been to cooperate with the copyright owners in devising technol-
ogy which would allow the broadcaster to jam the video recorder
from copying.”235  Essentially, the arguments from the recording
industry mirrored those put forth in Sony .  The question before
the court, therefore, was really whether Sony  would continue to
be applicable in a digital world.
In responding to that question, the Ninth Circuit agreed with
229 See id.
230 Id . at 1045-46.
231 Id . at 1046.
232 Oral Argument, MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (2000), available
at  http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20040823002045984 (last visited Feb.
25, 2005); see also Ren Bucholz, Betamax:  Back to the Future , LAWMEME, Feb. 10,
2004 (on file with author), at http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?name
=News&file=article&sid=1324.
233 See, e.g. , Bucholz, supra note 232. R
234 Id .
235 Oral Argument, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984), available at  http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/case/768/audioresources
(last visited Feb. 24, 2005); see also  Bucholz, supra note 232. R
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the district court, noting that “[a]ny examination of contributory
copyright infringement must be guided by . . . Sony .”236  The
court emphasized that the defendants had not only shown that
their peer-to-peer systems were capable of substantial nonin-
fringing uses, as required by Sony , but had also shown that those
uses had commercial viability.237  For that reason, the defendants
could not be liable for constructive knowledge of infringement
and MGM would have to prove, instead, that defendants had
specific knowledge of infringement at a time they could do some-
thing about it.238  Because of the decentralized structure of their
systems, however, neither Grokster nor StreamCast could con-
trol their users’ infringing activities.  Accordingly, neither could
be held liable for contributory infringement.239
The Ninth Circuit also agreed with the district court that de-
fendants were not liable for vicarious infringement.  Only the
third element of vicarious infringement, the right and ability to
supervise the infringers’ activity, was at issue since the existence
of both direct infringement and direct financial benefit was un-
disputed.240  Here, again, the Ninth Circuit pointed to the decen-
tralized structure of defendants’ systems to demonstrate that
defendants lacked any supervisory capability.241  Defendants
could not block access to individual users or filter their content
because all files were stored on the individual users’ computers,
not on any of defendants’ servers.  “[A] duty to alter software
and files located on one’s own computer system,” the court
noted, “is quite different in kind from a duty to alter software
located on another person’s computer.”242  Moreover, the court
struck down MGM’s argument that, because defendants had
profited from turning a “blind eye” to their users’ infringing ac-
tivities, the court should hold them vicariously liable.243  No such
independent theory of vicarious liability exists.244
One of the primary purposes of the DMCA, as elucidated in
the White Paper, was to ensure that content providers would
236 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004).
237 Id . at 1162.
238 Id .
239 Id . at 1164.
240 Id .
241 Id . at 1165.
242 Id . at 1166.
243 Id .
244 Id.
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continue putting their material on the Internet.245  Copyright-rich
industries fought hard to ensure that the DMCA would achieve
this goal by ensuring that the law came down strongly in favor of
authors’ rights.  Consequently, case law, even when not dealing
with provisions of the DMCA, has tended to ensure broad pro-
tection to copyright owners, even at the expense of limiting
sound policies like that of Sony .  By not granting the motion pic-
ture industry’s request to ban videocassette technology, the Su-
preme Court in Sony  paved the way for technological advances
that worked to the benefit of all involved—the movie industry
and public alike.246  Twenty years later, the same battle is again
being fought.  A success for Grokster and StreamCast in the Su-
preme Court will, like Sony , mark a significant victory for all par-




The imbalance created by the DMCA has not gone unnoticed.
Pending legislation before the 108th Congress speaks to some of
the very concerns enumerated in this Comment.  House Bill
1066, for example, is designed to maintain copyright’s traditional
balance in the digital age by “prevent[ing] and punish[ing] digital
pirates without treating every consumer as one.”247  Other pro-
posals similarly seek to restore the historic balance between pub-
lic and private interests.248  Unfortunately, still other proposed
bills seek to expand the rights of copyright owners even further.
House Bill 1066, appropriately titled the “BALANCE Act” or
“Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Con-
sumer Expectations Act of 2003,” was introduced by Congress-
woman Zoe Lofgren of California.249  As its name suggests, the
bill would attempt to restore balance by amending the DMCA in
245 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. R
246 The motion picture industry now earns more money from video rentals and
sales than from theatrical releases.  Moreover, the public now has greater access to a
wider selection of works.  Apparently the public has found the pricing structure for
video rentals and sales acceptable enough to shy away from widespread piracy. See
JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 786. R
247 Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expecta-
tions Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. § 2(9) (2003).
248 See, e.g. , Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong.
(2003).
249 See  H.R. 1066.
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light of the historic purposes of copyright law.250  The bill would
acknowledge that the DMCA has been interpreted contrary to
Congress’s intent by prohibiting all  users from circumventing
technological controls, rather than only restricting users who cir-
cumvent to make infringing uses.  As a result, the bill would
amend the DMCA to specifically permit fair use to make archi-
val copies of digital works or to privately perform or display the
work on a digital media device.251  Further, noninfringing uses of
digital works would be permitted, as would disseminating the
technological means to make noninfringing uses.252  The BAL-
ANCE Act would also affirm the applicability of the first sale
doctrine to digital works.253
Another piece of legislation, introduced in the 108th Congress
by Representative Rick Boucher, similarly seeks to restore the
fair use doctrine under the DMCA.  House Bill 107, or the “Digi-
tal Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003,” would amend section
1201 of the DMCA to ensure that it was not a violation “to cir-
cumvent a technological measure in connection with access to, or
the use of, a work if such circumvention does not result in an
infringement of the copyright in the work.”254  Moreover, the bill
would codify the Sony  doctrine, ensuring its applicability to the
digital world by making it legal to manufacture or distribute
hardware or software products capable of enabling significant
noninfringing uses.255  In addition, the bill would amend the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, making the sale of copy-protected
CDs that were not so labeled an unfair method of competition
and deceptive practice.256
House Bill 1066 and House Bill 107 are direct attempts to
grant back some of the traditional rights the public enjoyed
under copyright law.  In that sense they reaffirm the statutory
grant theory of copyright—that authors should be rewarded with
a monopoly only so extensive as to encourage additional crea-
tion.  But other legislation pending before Congress would lend
more support to the authors’ rights theory of copyright.  House
Bill 2752 would establish criminal penalties for placing copy-
250 Id . § 2(9).
251 Id . § 3(b)(1).
252 Id . § 5.
253 Id . § 4.
254 H.R. 107, 108th Cong. § 5(b)(1) (2003).
255 Id . § 5(b)(2).
256 Id . § 3.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-4\ORE406.txt unknown Seq: 38  3-MAY-05 13:56
1386 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
righted works on computer networks, helping to reinforce the
copyright owner’s ability to control all access to the work.257  In
addition, House Bill 2517, the “Piracy Deterrence and Education
Act of 2003,” would, among other things, give the FBI the power
to make copyrighted works available on the Internet for pur-
poses of issuing warnings to unsuspecting downloaders.258
Whether any of these bills will ever get out of committee is
anyone’s guess.  Still, their introduction is informative.  That
twenty-four members of Congress joined Representative
Boucher as co-sponsors of a bill to reinvigorate the fair use doc-
trine for digital works,259 for example, shows that even if the bill
dies, the debate will likely continue.  Since the enactment of the
DMCA, users’ rights groups like the Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion, whose attorneys argued the case for Grokster in the Su-
preme Court, have steadily grown in size, power, and influence.
It is not unreasonable to think that the result of such a trend will
eventually lead to changes in copyright law favoring the general
public.  In other words, users’ rights groups may eventually join
other copyright industries at the bargaining table when hashing
out further changes to copyright law.
CONCLUSION
In a short blurb in the February 23, 2004 edition of the Na-
tional Review , an editor posed the question:  Does art pro-
gress?260  After reflecting on the discovery of Ice Age sculptures
in a cave at Tuebingen, creations which, although crafted with
crude instruments, were quite beautiful, the answer given was
“no.”261  That the sculpture’s creators demonstrated a somewhat
refined interpretive aesthetic sense was evidence that art existed
in a linear space.  After all, who is better than Shakespeare?262
Of course, just because one can believe Shakespeare is the great-
est writer in the Western tradition does not mean that art does
not progress.  Take away the works of Ovid and Chaucer and do
257 Author, Consumer, and Computer Owner Protection and Security Act of 2003,
H.R. 2752, 108th Cong. § 301 (2003).
258 H.R. 2517, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
259 Cosponsors of H.R. 107, Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00107:@@@P (last visited Mar. 30,
2005).
260 The Week , NAT’L REV., Feb. 23, 2004, at 12.
261 Id .
262 See id . (claiming that Shakespeare and Dante are generally thought the finest
poets in the Western tradition).
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you have Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucerne?  Take away com-
media dell’arte and does Shakespeare write The Comedy of Er-
rors?  The list of Shakespeare’s influences is extensive, and the
list of those who have since been influenced by Shakespeare’s
works is even longer.  Artists do incorporate, learn from, avoid,
study, and, yes, copy other artists’ works.  In this way art has
progressed through the centuries, hence the Founder’s stated
goal for copyright—to promote the progress  of useful arts.  A
necessary prerequisite to such progression is, of course, access to
other works.
The debate over how copyright law should apply to a digital
world is really just beginning.  After all the Internet, at least as
we think of it today, is only about fifteen years old,263 and peer-
to-peer file sharing really only came to mainstream attention in
the last five or six years.  But it is critical that the debate con-
tinue.  A 2002 study showed that the core copyright industries—
recorded music, television, movies, and books—accounted for
5.24% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product ($535.1 billion).264
Moreover, copyright industries continue to grow and create jobs
at a higher rate than the rest of the economy.265  From 1977 to
2001, for example, copyright employment grew from 3.3% of the
U.S. workforce to 5.9%.266  The United States is now the world’s
largest net exporter of intellectual property by far, a trend that is
unlikely to change anytime soon.267  What all this means is that
copyright issues will continue to be at the forefront for some
time.  Given the importance of copyright in the United States,
Congress needs to take an active role in monitoring whether the
laws are serving their proper function and achieving balance.
For now there is no reason to dismiss the manner in which
Congress has elected to handle the development of copyright
law.  Indeed, in what has become such a highly technical area it
makes sense to allow those with the expertise, and those who will
most directly be affected by the laws, to have a hand in their
263 The prevalence of Internet usage has grown exponentially in that time.  In
1995, approximately nine percent of adults in the United States were online, while in
2002 that number had grown to sixty-six percent. See Robyn Greenspan, Two-
Thirds Hit the Net , Apr. 17, 2002, at http://www.clickz.com/stats/big_picture/ ge-
ographics/ article.php/5911_1011491.
264 STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2002
REPORT 3 (2002).
265 Id . at 4.
266 Id .
267 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 2. R
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development.  Yet Congress, as the representative of the public,
should not hand over the reins completely.  Congress needs to
maintain a steady gaze over the conclusions and proposals arising
out of the various copyright industries’ private negotiations to
ensure that those industries do not tread too far on the public’s
traditional right to access and use copyrighted works.  The digital
revolution is fraught with peril, to be sure, but it is also ripe with
possibility.  There is room for everyone.
